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Introduction1 
This chapter argues that an important fabric of EU administrative governance is the emerging 
multilevel community administration. This community administration integrates essential 
parts of national government institutions and important segments of the EU institutions. The 
study demonstrates that the domestic components of the community administration include 
the lower middle levels of the member-states’ ministries and agencies/directorates. At the EU-
level the community administration covers the lower echelons of the Commission services, 
the Commission agencies, the Commission expert committees, the Council working parties, 
the comitology committees, and finally the national civil servants seconded to the 
Commission for shorter periods of time (Trondal 2004). Together, this community 
administration meshes and integrates executive institutions at two levels of government 
charged with responsibilities for policy initiation, policy decisions and policy implementation 
(Heywood and Wright 1997).  
 
This study highlights the development of a community administration within the three classes 
of EU committees referred to above. These committees integrate national civil servants into 
EU decision-making processes. They pose, however, different challenges to the decision-
making behaviour, roles and loyalties among the officials attending these committee 
meetings. The survey data presented reveals that the institutional autonomy of the community 
administration is stronger within the European Commission than within the Council and the 
comitology setting. Hence, the picture of one unified community administration has to be 
sacrificed for the model of a multifaceted community administration balancing 
intergovernmental, functional and supranational dynamics. The data thus seriously challenges 
sweeping generalisations of administrative fusion and bureaucratic engrenage (Wessels 
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1998). This chapter also demonstrates that deliberative dynamics are not omnipotent within 
the comitology committees as asserted by Joerges and Neyer (1997). 
 
EU committees represent adequate laboratories for studying what happens when contrasting 
decision-making dynamics meet because such committees embody civil servants from 
different layers of governance. Arguably, EU committees embody primarily three decision 
making dynamics: 1) defending nation-state preferences (intergovernmentalism), 2) providing 
neutral expertise (functionalism), and 3) defending the “common European good” 
(supranationalism). The study poses the following question: to what extent do domestic civil 
servants evoke intergovernmental, supranational or functional role perceptions and decision-
making behaviour when attending EU committees? This study demonstrates how these three 
decision-making dynamics are balanced within the community administration by analysing 
the role orientations and decision-making behaviour of domestic EU committee participants. 
This question pertains to the problematic nature of the transformative power of international 
organisations in general and in EU institutions in particular (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). 
EU committees are important laboratories for studying transformational change that 
transcends the territorial dynamics of Westphalia because they have codified and 
institutionalised the bringing together of national and community officials in day-to-day 
decision-making. Assuming that functional and supranational dynamics transcend the existing 
territorial nation-state order, intergovernmental dynamics are treated as our null hypothesis. 
The study covers the following EU committees: The Commission expert committees (ECs), 
preparing decisions for the Commission, the Council working parties (CWPs), preparing 
decisions for the Council of Ministers, and the so-called comitology (CCs) committees, 
assisting the Council in controlling delegated powers to the European Commission. 
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Decision-making within EU committees is about initiating and drafting optimal and effective 
policy proposals and aggregating interests towards stabile equilibrium, creating preferences, 
meaning, identities and roles, and transforming these into integrated regulative, cognitive, 
normative and symbolic arrangements (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; March and Olsen 1994: 
265). Committees are ‘generic features of modern political life’, important venues for 
regulative decision making in the EU and important arenas where national and supranational 
decision-makers meet, interact, persuade, argue, bargain, adapt, learn and re-socialise 
(Christiansen and Kirchner 2000: 12). Hence, decision-making within EU committees also 
pertains to the less acknowledged aspects of actor socialisation and re-socialisation, identity 
change and role-play (Checkel 2004). The identities and roles activated by individual EU 
committee decision-makers are moulded institutionally through processes of matching 
perceptions of appropriateness to particular situations and through systematic and routinised 
allocation of attention. Departing from a ‘sociological’ and a ‘cognitive’ institutionalist 
perspective, this study argues for middle-range institutionalist theorising on EU committee 
governance. The endeavour is to unravel important institutional conditions under which 
national decision-makers evoke particular roles and decision-making behaviour when 
attending EU committees. 
 
Studies of European integration and domestic change have increasingly transcended the sui 
generis distinction between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism that dominated 
earlier theorising of European integration. Several bridge-building exercises between 
intergovernmental and neo-functional approaches have been suggested during recent years, 
notably, deliberative perspectives (e.g. Eriksen and Fossum 2000), social constructivist 
accounts (e.g. Checkel 2004; Risse 2002), institutional and organisation theory approaches 
(Egeberg 2004; Olsen 2003), and multilevel governance and network approaches (e.g. 
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Kohler-Koch 2003). This list is not intended to be exhaustive (see Jupille, Caporaso and 
Checkel 2003). This chapter suggests that the conceptual divide between 
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism may be surmounted and bridged by outlining 
middle-range institutionalist approaches that explicate measurable hypotheses. This bridge-
building exercise is done by specifying the institutional conditions under which different 
decision-making dynamics prevail within EU committees, be they intergovernmental, 
functional and/or supranational dynamics.  
 
The study outlines two institutionalist arguments on institutional ‘mattering’, one cognitive 
and one “sociological”. By combining these institutionalist accounts, a multilevel 
institutionalist approach is outlined emphasising the causal impact of domestic and EU 
institutions. The study buys into the multilevel governance approach as a descriptive device 
but not an explanatory toolkit. Accordingly, the role perceptions and decision-making 
behaviour evoked by EU committee participants is explained by reference to their multiple 
institutional embeddedness. Multiply embedded civil servants are Janus-faced and are 
constantly challenged by competing expectations and perceptions regarding what roles to play 
and what decision-making behaviour to emphasise in different situations (Egeberg 1999; 
Trondal 2000). To substantiate this claim, the study specifies the conditional validity of six 
institutional mechanisms. Assuming that a mix of different institutions moulds civil servants’ 
roles and behaviour, six ceteris paribus clauses are outlined that explicate the causal arrows 
and the expected empirical implications. The highlighted hypotheses are suggestive, although 
not exhaustive. The chapter proceeds in the following three main steps. The next section 
outlines a middle-range institutionalist approach and outlines six operational hypotheses on 
how domestic and EU institutions ‘matter’. The next section introduces the data and 
methodology. We then proceed to an empirical illustration of the hypotheses. The empirical 
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analysis benefits from an extensive survey that includes national civil servants from 14 
member-states with experiences from EU committees.  
 
A Middle-range Institutionalist Approach 
The roles and identities evoked by individuals are causally salient because they provide 
cognitive, normative and ethical priors and generalised prescriptions of how to act in different 
situations. Roles and identities evoked by incumbents in public administration are foremost 
the product of primary and secondary institutional socialisation processes (Egeberg 2004). 
This study focuses on roles and decision-making behaviour as institutionally constructed at 
the crossroads of national civil services and the EU committees. To account for how domestic 
and EU institutions frame role and behaviour the study employs a ‘sociological’ and a 
‘cognitive’ institutionalist approach. Whereas the sociological perspective underscores roles 
and decision-making behaviour as products of the logic of appropriateness, the cognitive 
perspective explains officials’ role perceptions and behavioural pattern by referring to their 
bounded rational choices (March and Olsen 1995; Simon 1957). The ‘pure’ rational choice 
institutionalist account is left out of the analysis basically because it neglects the constitutive 
role that both domestic and EU institutions have on actors’ roles and behaviour and reduce it 
to a question of optimalisation of expected utility.  
 
The cognitive argument advocates that organisations serve as buffers to information and 
thereby simplify the relevant decision-making stimuli exposed to incumbents. The bounded 
and local rationality of decision-makers is subsequently aggregated systematically into 
organisational rationality by this buffer function. Consequently, the systematic selection of 
information and relevant premises for decision making and role enactment mould how 
organizational members think, feel and act (Simon 1957). According to this cognitive 
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perspective, decision-making dynamics are conditioned by the formal organisation of public 
administration, both domestically and at the EU level. 
 
The ‘sociological’ argument stresses that institutions are more than formal organisations and 
that the roles and behavioural patterns unfolding within institutions are ‘driven by rules of 
appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized into institutions’ (March and Olsen 2004:2). 
Whereas a cognitive perspective focuses on the allocation of scarce attention among bounded 
rational actors, the sociological perspective focuses on how actors match identities and roles 
to particular situations, and that this matching process takes time, is inefficient and path-
dependent (March and Olsen 1995). ‘The central logic is that of matching one’s repertoire of 
identities and roles to specific (institutional) situations’ (Trondal 2001: 15). In our context, 
EU committee participants may be seen as maintaining a repertoire of national, functional and 
supranational roles and identities, ‘each providing rules of appropriate behaviour in situations 
for which they are relevant’ (March and Olsen 2004:4). 
 
Whereas a cognitive perspective emphasises the historical efficiency of organisations and the 
causal importance of formal organisations to understand incumbents’ roles and decision-
making behaviour (roles and behaviour adapt efficiently to organisational contingencies), the 
sociological approach highlights the historical inefficiency of institutions (roles and behaviour 
adapt slowly and imperfectly to institutional contingencies). Moreover, whereas the cognitive 
perspective departs from a bounded rational perspective on human computational capacities, 
the sociological approach views actors as socialised humans that have normatively 
internalised ‘patterns of behaviour and role expectations which characterize the groups in 
which they interact’ (Alderson 2001: 416). Normatively internalised behaviour and roles are 
taken for granted and thus go beyond mere behavioural compliance. Accordingly, the length 
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and intensity of interaction within groups and the length and intensity of exposure towards 
decision-making situations affect processes of socialisation of in-group behaviour and roles. 
‘Identities can be seen as arising from a process of socialization into socially defined 
relationships and roles’ (March 1994: 62). Accordingly, ‘[t]he longer one is exposed to 
particular stimuli; the more one is likely to absorb these influences’ (Hooghe 2001: 15). This 
is particularly relevant for explaining supranational roles (see H6 below).  
 
According to both the cognitive and the sociological institutional approaches, organisational 
and institutional borders, respectively, are causally relevant because they create relevance 
criteria for particular roles and behavioural patterns (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). From this 
premise it follows that civil servants, having several organisational and institutional 
affiliations, are exposed to multiple buffers to attention, logics of appropriateness, 
classification schemes, temporal rhythms, physical structures and symbolic arrangements 
(Biddle 1986:73). Moreover, single organisations may provide more or less consistent and 
conflicting challenges to the organisational members and more or less ambiguous cues for 
action. However, most of the time organisational dynamics are triggered when organisational 
borders are challenged by internal and external actors criss-crossing them. Civil servants who 
are multiply embedded tend to cross organisational borders fairly frequently and evoke 
multiple cognitive priors and perceptions of appropriate behaviour. Relevant to ask is what 
happens ‘when the state [and its civil servants] is embedded in more than one institution and 
each institution demands a different role and set of behavioral actions’ (Barnett 1993: 273)?  
 
After all, “[d]emocratic governance involves balancing the enduring tensions between 
different logics of action…” (March and Olsen 2004:17). The emerging multilevel 
community administration analysed here activates several partly colliding governance 
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dynamics. Arguably, inter-organisational activities reduce the perceptional barriers to create 
new roles and behaviour because the actors are exposed to new experiences and information 
(March and Olsen 2004:13). The empirical data presented below reveals that functional roles 
and behavioural patterns are activated among officials attending ECs. By contrast, officials 
attending the CWPs and CCs evoke the role as a national representative more strongly. This 
difference between EC, CWP and CC participants are due to the organisational components 
underneath the Commission and the Council of Ministers (see H5 below). National officials 
attending EU committee participants, however, have their primary institutional affiliations 
back home. Hence, the domestic ministry and agency to which they are employed is likely to 
mould their roles and behaviour more strongly than the EU committees.  
 
The concept of multiple roles goes beyond an either-or style of representation, as seen in the 
‘free agency versus mandate’ emphasised by intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists 
(Eulau et al. 1959: 746). It is commonly assumed that civil servants evoke multiple roles 
(Biddle 1986).2 However, multiple roles may be differently related; they may be 
hierarchically nested, crosscutting and/or meshed and blended (Wendt 1994: 385). I argue that 
roles often are crosscutting on different dimensions or cleavages (Radaelli 1999: 34). For 
example, civil servants in domestic sector ministries are accustomed to the role of an 
independent neutral expert. Diplomats at the Foreign Office, however, are used to combining 
the sector expert role along with the role as a national representative. These roles are relevant 
on a sectoral – territorial cleavage but irrelevant on another cleavage: the national – 
supranational cleavage. Accordingly, civil servants evoking a supranational role, perceiving 
oneself as a community official, may at the same time evoke a territorial role, perceiving 
oneself as a national representative, because these roles are cross-cutting. Moreover, 
particular roles may be more or less important to civil servants in particular situations. A role 
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that is perceived as marginal to a civil servant is not likely to outweigh a role deemed salient. 
Hence, civil servants tend to live with role conflicts because they attach different weight to 
them, and because some of them crosscut each other. Finally, roles may be evoked 
sequentially in different institutional contexts. Hence, role conflicts may be coped with by 
sequential attention.  
 
The next two sub-sections outline six hypotheses that each specifies conditions under which 
intergovernmental, functional and supranational role perceptions and decision-making 
behaviour are evoked by national officials attending EU committees. 
 
Hypotheses on domestic institutional ‘mattering’ 
Domestic civil servants are primarily affiliated to their national government institution, 
portfolio and role. These affiliations tend to mould decision-making behaviour and role 
perceptions because ‘[t]he routines of attention allocation tend to give priority to those things 
that are immediate, specific, operational and doable’ (March and Olsen 1979: 50). For 
example, domestic institutions are likely to influence domestic civil servants’ roles and 
behaviour more strongly than EU institutions. The following hypotheses are based on the 
sociological and cognitive perspectives on organizations and draws on fairly generic 
principles in organisational life. 
 
H1 Bureaucrats used to specialised vertical organizational structures are more likely to adopt 
sectoral and supranational roles and behaviour than those used to vertically non-specialised 
organisational structures 
Generally, integrated and coherent polities are more robust against external demands and 
penetration than fragmented and disintegrated polities. H1 postulates that vertically 
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specialised structures are conducive to the emergence of sectoral and supranational roles and 
identities among civil servant (Egeberg 2001). Sectoral and functional roles may reflect the 
fact that vertically organised government institutions buffer and filter political signals and 
demands downward in the hierarchy. Civil servants may therefore act as independent and 
neutral sectoral experts within EU committees because they have the leeway to do so. 
Moreover, the lack of hierarchical control and steering within vertically specialised 
government structures enhances the leeway to act independently and evoke new supranational 
allegiances (Beyers and Trondal 2004). Civil servants from lower echelons in the domestic 
hierarchy are accustomed to professional autonomy and the appropriateness of role flexibility 
and freedom of manoeuvre, and are thereby inclined to adopt new supranational roles when 
entering the hallways of the EU committees. 
 
H2 Bureaucrats from sectoral ministries are more likely to adopt sectoral and supranational 
roles and behaviour than diplomats from the Foreign Office and the Permanent 
Representation in Brussels  
Sectoral organisational structures are conducive to the emergence of sectoral roles and 
behavioural patterns because civil servants are exposed to sectoralised information, 
considerations, criteria for success, cues for action, etcetera. Moreover, lack of co-ordination 
from the Foreign Office may accompany the enactment of supranational roles among EU 
committee participants. ‘Not being reminded of their “national missions” on a daily basis in 
Brussels, the actors can easily lose sight of the nation-state as their primary locus of loyalty’ 
(Trondal 2002: 473). Bureaucrats attached to the Foreign Office in the capitals and diplomats 
at the Permanent Representations in Brussels are more used to think in territorial terms as they 
represent their country (territory) and not a specific policy sector. The Council infrastructure 
is largely compatible with the territorial principle of organisation these officials are used to 
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(See H4). As these officials become primarily involved in Council decision-making during the 
later stages of COREPER-deliberations, they are - compared to bureaucrats at the lower 
echelons of working groups - likely to consider issues in terms of ‘national interests’. 
 
H3 The greater the degrees of organisational and  institutional misfit between domestic 
institutions and EU committees, the more likely that officials change role and behavioural 
patterns  
H3 argues that organisational and institutional misfit across levels of governance accompanies 
a perceived adaptational pressure among civil servants towards role shift and behavioural 
adjustments (Egeberg 2004). Arguably, ‘[t]he impact of institutional compatibility reflects the 
compatibility of cognitive shortcuts and scripts’ (Trondal 2000: 316) and similar logics of 
appropriateness (March and Olsen 1995). Organisational and institutional misfits accompany 
role conflicts, notably between national, functional and supranational roles. “The concurrent 
appearance of two or more incompatible expectations for the behaviour of a person” is likely 
to challenge existing roles and established behavioural practices among civil servants because 
they are exposed to new sets of information and new situations that leave existing roles and 
identities less relevant (Biddle 1986:82). Accordingly, organisational and institutional misfit 
is conducive to supranationalism among domestic civil servants attending EU committees. 
This argument may explain the contra-intuitive observation made below that some EU 
committees tend to reinforce intergovernmentalism. This is the case among national officials 
coming from the Foreign Office attending the CWPs and the CCs.  
 
Hypotheses on EU institutional ‘mattering’ 
H4 Officials attending the ECs are more likely to evoke sectoral roles and decision-making 
behaviour than civil servants participating in the CWPs and the CCs r 
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Parallel to domestic sector ministries, the Commission ECs are primarily organised according 
to a sector principle, as opposed to the CWPs and the CCs, which are primarily organised 
according to a territorial principle, mirroring the domestic Foreign Office (see H2) (Egeberg 
and Trondal 1999). Accordingly, we assume that government officials attending the ECs 
evoke a sectoral role perception and decision-making behaviour. On the contrary, 
participation in the CWPs and CCs is primarily conducive to the emergence of a national role 
perception. Moreover, all government institutions, including EU committees, are organised 
according to several principles, and thus pose additional challenges to civil servants to evoke 
several partially conflicting roles. However, we expect EC participants to mainly evoke an 
expert role, and CWP and CC participants to mainly emphasise a national role (Egeberg and 
Trondal 1999).  
 
H5 The longer domestic officials have participated in EU committees, the more likely that 
they evoke a supranational role 
According to the sociological institutionalist perspective institutional ‘mattering’ is subject to 
time lags. When domestic civil servants first attend EU committees they are not likely to 
become instantly re-socialised. They are more likely to evoke roles that have recently been 
evoked (March 1994: 70). As civil servants interact with officials of other nationalities and 
with Commission officials over time they are likely to become slowly re-socialised into 
community-minded supranational agents. Accordingly, the longer civil servants have 
participated in EU committees, the more likely that they have internalised a supranational 
role. Research on small groups indicates that the development of in-group consensus is 
associated with the duration of interaction among the same actors, and subsequently of the age 
of the group (Biddle 1986:77). 
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H6 The more intense degrees of participation and interaction within EU committees, the more 
likely that officials take on a supranational role 
Whereas H5 emphasises the causal effect of time, H6 highlights the causal weight of intensity 
of interaction to the understanding of supranationalism. Intensive interaction in our context 
refers to the number of EU committees attended, the number of formal and informal sessions 
joined, the degrees of active involvement during discussions, joining work lunches, etcetera. 
Contact theory and small group theory emphasise the causal importance of face-to-face 
interaction and contact repetition to understand role and identity change (Hart et al. 1997; 
Pettigrew 1998). According to Checkel (1999: 549), ‘[s]ocial learning is more likely where a 
group meets repeatedly, and there is a high density of interaction among participants’. 
Similarly, March (1999: 29) argues that, [t]he interactive character of decision making 
extends over time so that the development of beliefs, rules, and expectations in one 
organization is intertwined with their development in others’. 
 
Data and Method 
Since 1995 the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) in Maastricht has 
organised seminars for member-state officials on the role of committees in the EU political 
process. In the spring of 1997 we started to distribute a questionnaire3 to those participants in 
the seminars who had been involved in one or several committees at the EU level. The 
questionnaire was designed to give an overview of the experience of member-state officials in 
EU committees: In what kind and how many committees they were involved, how frequently 
meetings were taking place, how long they lasted, what languages were used, how committee 
meetings were co-ordinated, etcetera. The major part of the questionnaire focussed on the 
question of how member-state officials viewed the roles they performed in these committees, 
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how they perceived the roles performed by other participants and how well they were co-
ordinated and prepared before meetings. 
 
During the first day of the seminar, those participants who had been involved in EU 
committees were asked to complete the questionnaire. By distributing the questionnaires at 
the first day of the Seminar, we minimised potential influences or “noise” from the seminar as 
such. Participation in the seminars in Maastricht was very unevenly distributed between 
different member-states. There were very few participants from the Southern member-states, 
but regular participation from central European member-states, the U.K. and Ireland. In 
addition to the seminars in Maastricht, EIPA organised a number of “Comitology seminars” 
in the member-states, particularly those that had joined the EU during the last wave of 
enlargement in 1995. Unquestionably, this led to a very unbalanced sample towards the new 
member-states. In order to correct this, an effort was made in early 1999 to contact the 
permanent representation of all the member-states from which we had a very small number of 
respondents (N), asking them to help to increase the number of completed questionnaires 
from these member-states. This effort was very successful in the case of Belgium and Spain, 
but did not result in many additional completed questionnaires from the other member-states. 
The composition of the sample, by member-state, is summarised in Table 1. The Table also 
shows the type of ministry the respondents came from, differentiating between the foreign 
ministry, other ministries, agencies and the member-state’s permanent representation in 
Brussels. 
 
Table 1 about here 
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This sample cannot claim to be representative neither with respect to the member-states 
included, nor with respect to the type of committees which member-state officials participate 
in. From the total sample, 132 respondents participated in ECs, 134 participated in CWPs and 
76 in CCs. Not unexpectedly, 61 respondents participated in at least two types of committees 
and 31 in all three types. Moreover, the officials studied here are mostly employed within 
ministries other than the Foreign Ministry and in medium or lower rank positions. Moreover, 
our data (not presented in Table 1) show that EC participants are mostly recruited from 
sectoral ministries and agencies and less from Permanent Representations. CWP participants, 
in contrast, are recruited to a larger extent from Permanent Representations and sectoral 
ministries. 
 
Like in all written questionnaires, there was a considerable number of missing items - 
respondents who did not complete all of the questions, even if – as was the case in our 
questionnaire – for most of the questions multiple choice answers were provided for. For this 
reason the N will vary between tables in the following sections.  
 
The Emerging Community Administration 
Despite Commission efforts to reduce the number of ECs and simplify the CC procedures, the 
sheer number of committees and the total complexity of the EU committee system seem to 
gradually increase over time (Larsson 2003:15; Schaefer 2002). For member-state officials, 
participation in EU committees means consumption of scarce resources like time, time that 
will not be available for national concerns. Table 2 shows that time spent on EU matters 
varies with the place in the hierarchy of a respondent. 
 
Table 2 about here 
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As could be expected, the major burden of committee work is carried by head of sections, 
senior advisers and advisers, the middle and lower middle level of member-states’ 
administrations. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents belong to this group. These observations 
are empirically supported by the studies of Egeberg (1999), Trondal (2001) and Trondal and 
Veggeland (2003). Surprising is the relatively large proportion (20 percent) who come from 
the Director General or Deputy Director General level.4 This can possibly be explained by the 
fact that it is common practice that, on important issues, the top level of member-states’ 
administrations will attend committee meetings in Brussels, often accompanied by lower level 
officials. It may also be taken as an indicator of the importance assigned by member-states’ 
administrations to EU matters. The fact that more than 60 percent of this top-level group 
spends almost a day or more of their weekly working time on EU matters supports this 
conclusion. Moreover, CWP participants report that they seldom attend committee meetings 
alone. Most of the time officials go together with colleagues from their own ministry or from 
the Permanent Representations. Hence, the community administration includes large 
proportions of the domestic administrative fabric, notably the lower middle level of experts 
civil servants. 
 
Member-state officials’ roles and identities. 
Civil servants often evoke multiple preferences, interests, roles and identities due to their 
multiple institutional embeddedness. Civil servants are multiple selves with several non-
hierarchical interests and allegiances (Elster 1986; Fouilleux, Smith and Maillard 2002; Risse 
2002). The evocation of one particular interest or identity does not necessarily trump another. 
By attending different institutions at different levels of governance officials learn to wear 
Janus-faces and to live with diversity and partially conflicting interests and loyalties (Lewis 
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1998). Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997) picture a “continuous tension between the home 
affiliation and the pull of the collective forum”. However, particular roles, identities and 
modes of decision-making behaviour tend to be evoked in some situations more than in others 
(March and Olsen 1995; Simon 1957). 
 
National officials attending EU committees spend most of their time and energy in national 
administrations5. Accordingly, we expect their dominant institutional allegiances and 
identifications to be national when entering EU committees. However, “membership” in EU 
committees imposes additional obligations on officials, although for most of a secondary 
character. They are exposed to new agendas and actors, and are expected to look for common 
solutions (Egeberg 1999). According to Christiansen and Kirchner (2000), “committees 
permit national officials to familiarise themselves with the nature of the EU’s administrative 
system”. However, officials participating in CWPs and in CCs may be expected to behave 
more like government representatives than officials attending Commission ECs. The main 
reason for this is the basically territorial principle of organisation underlying both Council and 
comitology groups. In the Commission ECs, on the other hand, participants are expected to 
behave more like independent experts. Thus, professional allegiances and sectoral role 
conceptions are likely to be enacted fairly strongly among the latter (H4).  
 
Table 3 shows that national officials who attend different EU committees express more 
allegiance towards their own national government institutions than towards the EU 
committees on which they participate (H1 and H2). Thus as expected, EU-level loyalties seem 
to be secondary to national allegiances. However, some officials feel considerable 
responsibility towards EU level entities, particularly the CWP participants (Lewis 1998). This 
is mostly due to the high degree of intensity of day-to-day participation within the CWP 
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meetings (H6). Hence, a certain kind of ‘system allegiance’ seems to be stronger among CWP 
officials than among EC and CC participants. Intergovernmentalism and EU-level loyalty thus 
do not seem to conflict but to complement each other (Risse 2002) (H3). Moreover, the vast 
majority of the committee participants have positive attitudes towards European integration 
generally and within their “own” policy/issue area particularly. However, relatively few 
officials change attitudes in this regard due to committee participation (Egeberg, Schaefer and 
Trondal 2003: 25). 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Also as expected, those in CWPs tend to assign more weight to their relationship to their own 
government than those attending the Commission ECs, although the difference is not very big. 
A remarkably large proportion of CWP participants identify themselves with their own sector 
administration, policy arena or professional background. This pattern is probably due to the 
high degree of functional specialisation that accompanies participation in the basically 
intergovernmentally arranged Council structure. Hence, national officials attending EU 
committees evoke a complex role repertoire indeed (H3). 
 
The respondents were further asked to indicate how they perceived the roles of their fellow 
colleagues within EU committees.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Table 4 reveals that civil servants who attend CWPs and CCs tend to consider other 
colleagues mainly as government representatives (Fouilleux, Smith and Maillard 2002; 
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Schaefer 2002). Commission EC participants, on the other hand, tend to perceive other 
colleagues as having more mixed roles (H4). Hence, only a minority (45 percent) find that 
their counterparts behave mainly as government representatives. Thus, although role 
conceptions are highly multi-faceted across types of committee (cf. Table 3), actual behaviour 
seems to mirror more clearly the prevalent organisational features of the various arenas (H4).  
 
Next, the respondents were asked to asses how much consideration they put on proposals, 
statements and arguments from different actors and institutions when attending EU 
committees. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
First, almost no major differences can be observed between officials attending different EU 
committees as far as the above considerations are concerned. Second, as to the relative 
priority given to the proposals, statements and arguments of other actors, one consideration 
seems to be more important than others: Officials attending EU committees pay most 
attention to what their colleagues and experts from their own country have to say. This 
observation underscores the tendency already indicated in Tables 3 and 4 on the primacy of 
national allegiances among EU committee participants (H1). Participants, however, also 
emphasise the points of view of colleagues from other member-states who have demonstrated 
considerably expertise on the subject matter at hand. Officials give considerably less attention 
to arguments from colleagues from large member-states as such, and colleagues from 
member-states within their own region. In support of the deliberative supranationalist account 
(e.g. Joerges and Neyer 1997), the quality of the argument presented by other committee 
participants is considered more important than the sheer size and geopolitical location of the 
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member-states they represent. Moreover, the EU Commission is also considered more 
important than large member-states and member-states within their own region. Finally, 
interest groups and firms are deemed considerably less important than colleagues from other 
member-states. By comparison, however, interest groups and firms from their own country 
are considered much more important than EU level interest groups and firms. This 
observation underscores the general tendency apparent in Table 5, namely that national 
officials attending EU committees pay more heed to national institutions than to supranational 
ones (H1). Hence, the community administration has a strong intergovernmental dynamic, 
particularly within the CWPs and the CCs. 
 
In sum, what we see is that arguing, not only bargaining, is a salient feature of the emerging 
community administration (Lewis 1998). Hence, the intergovernmental perspective, picturing 
national actors entering EU arenas with predetermined and fixed preferences has to be slightly 
modified. Obviously, deliberation is taking place among actors in which interests may be 
moved and reshaped on the basis of expert knowledge, however, not primarily in the CCs as 
assumed by Joerges and Neyer (1997).  
 
Moreover, there is obviously also a good deal of trust in the Commission, as further 
underpinned by Table 6. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
National officials attending different EU committees seem to agree on the relative 
independence of Commission officials from particular national interests. Only a very small 
minority, mostly among the CWP participants, reports that Commission officials act more in 
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the interest of their country of origin. Hence, there is obviously a good deal of trust in the 
Commission as an independent supranational executive.  
 
Thus, participation in EU committees tends to affect the institutional allegiances and role 
perceptions of the participants. Nonetheless civil servants largely retain their national and 
sectoral identities when attending EU committees. An element of EU-level loyalty does, 
however, supplement such pre-existing allegiances to some extent (H1 and H6). The 
emerging community administration thus seems to uphold a strong intergovernmental 
dynamic that weakens its institutional independence from the member-state administrations. 
As expected, however, the institutional autonomy is stronger among the ECs than among the 
CWPs and the CCs. 
 
The co-ordination behaviour of member-state officials attending EU committees. 
In the last section we have demonstrated that national officials attending Commission ECs are 
probably behaving more like independent experts than when attending CWPs and CCs. In 
contrast, when attending CWPs and CCs, national officials perceive themselves and their 
colleagues from other member-states more as government representatives. The different role 
and identity perceptions of national government officials attending different EU committees 
may partly reflect different co-ordination processes at the national level (Trondal 2002). One 
difference may be expected between officials attending Commission ECs on the one hand, 
and officials participating in CWPs and CCs on the other. Officials attending Commission 
ECs are expected to be less subject to national co-ordination. Officials attending CWPs and 
CCs, on the other hand, are more likely to participate in committee meetings with clearly co-
ordinated ‘positions’ from their respective national governments (Trondal 2000).  
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The reasons for this difference are twofold: The formal organisation of the committees and 
the voting practices within them. First, the Commission ECs are mainly organised according 
to sectoral and functional principles. The CWPs and the CCs, although sectorally and 
functionally specialised, have a stronger territorial component in their organisational 
structures (H4). Arguably, committees organised by territory accompany stronger co-
ordination pressure on the participants than committees organised by sector and function 
(Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Secondly, voting focuses the attention of decision-makers. 
Voting also signals expectations from the principals towards the agents with respect to 
representing agreed-on and often written “positions”. In contrast to CCs, the ECs and CWPs 
do not vote in any formal sense (Mattila and Lane 2001; Tuerk and Schaefer 2002). CWPs 
are, however, located more clearly in the “shadow of the vote” than Commission ECs (Golub 
1999; Tuerk and Schaefer 2002). Whereas EC participants are not expected to reach any 
agreements or formal decisions during most committee meetings, officials attending the 
CWPs and the CCs are expected to reach compromises, majority decisions and often 
consensus at the end of meetings (Lewis 1998). 
 
Table 7 reveals different modes of policy co-ordination behaviour amongst EU committee 
participants. As expected, participants in Commission ECs seem less co-ordinated nationally 
than officials participating in CWPs and CCs (H2 and H4). Officials attending CCs seem to 
be even better co-ordinated nationally than officials attending CWPs, though the difference is 
not very large. By comparison, officials in Commission ECs tend to take ‘positions’ that are 
less strongly co-ordinated back home (H1 and H2). Still, when asked whether national 
interests or professional considerations are deemed vital when deciding what ‘positions’ to 
pursue, no major differences are observed between officials participating in different EU 
committees (H4). CWP participants seem, however, to pay more attention to national interests 
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than do ECs and CC participants (Fouilleux, Smith and Maillard 2002). These differences are 
marginal, however. The most significant observation is that in Commission ECs, participants 
have much more leeway to follow “their” own position than in the CWPs and the CCs. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
Conclusion 
The study of European integration has increasingly shifted focus from the horizontal spill-
over processes at the EU level and the ‘grand bargains’ struck between the strong EU 
member-states towards the vertical blurring of governance levels across the EU – nation-state 
interface. This article has focused on the emerging community administration where 
government levels interact and affect each other. In the empirical analysis we observed that 
many national officials spend a considerable amount of time and energy on EU committee 
work. In fact almost one third of our respondents use at least half of their working hours on 
preparation, co-ordination and participation in EU committees. CWPs are more demanding in 
this respect than other EU committees. Officials from small member-states seem to attend 
meetings more frequently than their counterparts from larger countries. This is due to the 
smaller size of their administrations. 
 
Moreover, as could be expected given the primary institutional affiliation of national officials, 
national allegiances are more clearly expressed than EU-level identities. However, a 
considerable proportion also feels loyalty to the committee(s) in which they participate. A 
clear majority expresses considerable trust in the Commission in the sense that they 
acknowledge its independence from particular national interests. Commission officials are 
among their most important interlocutors. Sheer intergovernmentalism is also transcended in 
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the sense that the quality of the arguments seems more important than the kind of country the 
speaker originates from. The multiple roles and identities evoked by our respondents also 
point beyond a pure intergovernmental logic. In all kinds of committees they identify 
themselves heavily with sectoral and functional administrations and policy arenas. The 
government representative role is most clearly expressed in the CWP and CC settings. It is 
also in these settings that their positions and mandates are most clearly co-ordinated and 
instructed back home. As already said, our sample cannot claim to be a representative one. 
However, our main findings are clearly substantiated by studies based on other sources 
(Egeberg 1999; Trondal 2001; Trondal and Veggeland 2003).  
 
Recent literature argues that EU committees are sites of vertical and horizontal fusion of 
administrative systems and policy instruments, often described as Europeanisation (Egeberg 
1999, Maurer and Larsson 2002; Schaefer 2002; Trondal 2001). This study has pictured this 
phenomenon as the emergence of a multilevel community administration. The observations 
presented demonstrate that EU committees are indeed an important part of the emerging 
community administration that cross-cuts existing borders of the member-states and the EU 
institutional apparatus. The study demonstrates that the attention, energy, contacts, co-
ordination behaviour and loyalties of national civil servants are to a considerable extent 
directed towards the Brussels committee system. Hence, the decision-making and agenda-
setting processes within national governments are integrated into the EU agenda setting phase 
(see Larsson and Trondal in this volume). However, this study also indicates that the re-
socialising and transformative powers of the EU committees are heavily filtered and biased by 
the national institutions embedding the EU committee participants. Last, but not least, the data 
reveals that the institutional autonomy of this multilevel community administration is stronger 
within the Commission than within the Council and the comitology setting. Hence, the picture 
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of one unified community administration has to be sacrificed for the model of a multifaceted 
community administration balancing intergovernmental, functional and supranational 
dynamics. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 This study has been financially supported by Sørlandets kompetansefond, EIPA and ARENA. 
2 The emergence of multiple roles and identities may reflect ill-coordinated processes. New roles and identities 
may be adopted without removing old ones, old identities and roles may be removed without adopting new ones, 
or the mix of and balance between existing identities and roles may simply be reorganized. From a sociological 
institutionalist perspective it may be easier to adopt new roles and identities than to remove old ones. According 
to the cognitive perspective, however, the mix of roles and identities are likely to be institutionally contingent 
and efficient.  
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3 The questionnaire was jointly developed by Morten Egeberg, Jarle Trondal and Guenther F. Schaefer together 
with the „Comitology team“ at EIPA. By the end of 1999, 232 questionnaires had been completed. Of these, 8 
were Norwegians, and in 6 cases it was impossible to identify clearly the Member State affiliation of the 
respondents. Both these categories of respondents are excluded from this analysis. This article is thus based on 
218 completed questionnaires as indicated in table I. 
4 It could be argued that this may be the result of sampling. The top level of the Member State administrations 
can not usually be expected to attend three-day seminars. In fact, this top level may well be over-presented in our 
sample since it hardly constitutes 20% of a Member State’s administration. See also Institut für Europäische 
Politik (1987). 
5 Almost 30% of the respondents reported, however, that they spent 50% or more of their working time on EU 
matters. See Table 2. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 Composition of the sample, by member-state and institutional affiliation 
Ministry or Institution 
Member-State 
Foreign 
Ministry 
Other 
Ministries Agencies etc 
Permanent 
Representation 
Total 
AUSTRIA  14 3  17 
BELGIUM 2 20 7  29 
DENMARK 1 5 1  7 
FINLAND 2 17 2  21 
FRANCE  3 1  4 
GERMANY  7 3 1 11 
GREECE  1  1 2 
IRELAND  1  2 4a 
LUXEMBOURG 1    1 
NETHERLANDS 2 10 1  13 
PORTUGAL 5 3 1  9 
SPAIN  55 5  60 
SWEDEN 2 23 9  34 
UNITED KINGDOM 1 4 1  6 
TOTAL N 16 163 34 4 218a 
a) One respondent did not answer the question about institutional affiliation. 
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Table 2 Working time consumed on EU committee work, by position (%) 
 Position 
Working time 
consumed on EU 
committees 
Director general, 
Deputy dir. 
general 
Head/Deputy of 
unit/division 
Head of section, 
Senior advisor, 
Advisor 
Total 
15% or less 37 26 24 27 
15-50% 43 44 44 44 
50% or more 20 30 32 29 
% 100 100 100 100 Total 
N 40 27 131 198 
 
 
Table 3 Percentage who to a great extenta feel allegiance to (identify with or feel 
responsible to) the following when participating in EU committees 
 EC CWP CC 
My own government 65 76 69 
My own ministry, department or agency 74 81 60 
The requirements of the policy arena in which I am working 58 65 58 
My own professional background and expertise 60 65 60 
The committee or group in which I participate 39 57 44 
Total N                                                                               106 109 58 
a) Values 1 and 2 combined on the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (value 1), to a fairly great 
extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5). 
 
 
 
Table 4 Officials’ perception of the role of colleagues from other countries when 
participating in EU committees (%) 
 EC CWP CC 
Mainly independent experts 33 11 6 
Mixed roles 22 12 20 
Mainly government representative 45 77 74 
% 100 100 100 Total 
N 113 122 66 
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Table 5 Percentage who give much considerationa to proposals, statements and 
arguments from the following when participating in EU committees 
 EC CWP CC 
Colleagues and experts from my own Member-State 87 84 81 
Colleagues from other member-states who have demonstrated 
considerably expertise on the subject matter at hand 73 70 69 
Colleagues from large member-states 38 38 30 
Colleagues from member-states from my own region 42 46 48 
Colleagues from member-states who share a similar position 61 71 68 
Representatives from the Commission 57 60 57 
Interest groups and firms I know from my Member-State 26 32 44 
Interest groups and firms I know or have contact with at the 
European level 17 11 13 
Total N 113 121 66 
a) Values 1 and 2 combined on the following five-point scale: very much consideration (value 1), fairly much 
consideration (2), both/and (3), fairly little consideration (4), very little consideration (5). 
 
 
 
Table 6 National officials’ perceptions of Commission officials‘ independence of 
particular national interests when participating in EU committees (%) 
 EC CWP CC 
Mainly independent 81 70 79 
Mixed roles 13 18 16 
Mainly dependent 6 12 5 
     % 100 100 100 
Total 
N 109 112 63 
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Table 7 Percentage of officials who co-ordinate their “position” most of the timea before 
participating in EU committee meetings 
 EC CWP CC 
I have to co-ordinate with the Foreign Office or another central 
co-ordinating body 20 47 43 
My “position” has in fact been co-ordinated with all relevant 
ministries 28 47 53 
My “position” has been co-ordinated with all relevant 
departments in my own ministry 38 55 59 
I have clear instructions about the “position” I should take 28 35 46 
I take the “position” I think is in the best interest of my country 63 72 66 
I take the “position” I think is best on the basis of my 
professional expertise 43 43 34 
If I have no instructions, or if the question is not important for 
my country, I take the “position” I think is the best for the 
member-states as a group 
52 46 46 
Total N 110 119 62 
a) Value 1 on the following three-point scale: always or most of the time (value 1), about half of the time (2), 
rarely or never (3). 
 
 
